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Introduction
Reliable measures of real estate risk are notoriously hard to come by. Financial measures
of real estate volatility suffer from either appraisal-based “smoothing,” in the case of
privately held assets, or stock market “noise,” in the case of publicly traded companies.
Yet, ﬂuctuations in the underlying supply-demand dynamics of ofﬁce markets are readily
observable. Moreover, previous research suggests that these underlying fundamentals are
key determinants of ﬁnancial performance (Wheaton, 1987; Pyhrr, Webb and Born, 1990;
Mueller and Laposa, 1994).
This paper attempts to enhance our understanding of movements in these underlying
fundamentals and to build an explanatory model that identiﬁes economic factors likely to
be associated with ﬂuctuations in the ofﬁce market. For the last ninety years, ofﬁce
markets in the U.S. have moved through cycles in which periods of scarcity have been
followed by over-supply. Our analysis suggests that measures of ofﬁce market volatility,
such as movements in vacancy rates, are likely to be affected by different factors at
different stages of the cycle. An improved understanding of these factors should help
practitioners reach a better understanding of the amplitude and duration of the ofﬁce
market cycle in American cities.
Literature Review
A review of previous literature shows a steady evolutionary path in the examination of
ofﬁce market volatility. Where initial studies modeled ofﬁce market behavior based on a
homogenous national market; more recent models explored intermarket distinctions.
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Abstract. Previous literature has followed an evolutionary path in the examination of ofﬁce
market volatility. Where initial models were designed to show the close relationship between
economic fundamentals and volatility at the national level, more recent models have focused
on metro-level volatility. This study quantiﬁes the volatility associated with metropolitan
markets in terms of vacancy rates and identiﬁes those economic factors that underlie this
risk. The analysis suggests that movements in vacancy rates are likely to be affected by
different factors at different stages of the cycle. In the long run, this analysis shows that the
availability of capital had the strongest effect on the volatility of ofﬁce vacancy rates. In
periods that follow excess construction, market-speciﬁc, demand-side factors appear to be
the dominant inﬂuence.Analysis of market-level factors is important in order to identify the cause of volatility or
risk levels associated with speciﬁc ofﬁce markets.
Wheaton, in his early research (1987), examined the national ofﬁce market and studied
the causes of market movement that make the ofﬁce market cyclical. He determined that
both supply and demand variables respond directly to expected ofﬁce employment
changes, although noting that supply responds more quickly than demand. 
Pollakowski, Wachter and Lynford (1992) thought it inappropriate to impose a single
structure on all markets for demand and supply relationships; instead they tested for
structural differences across metropolitan areas by ofﬁce market size. Using data for
twenty-one metropolitan areas for a period of ten years, they concluded that the stage of
the real estate cycle is clearly not uniform across markets.
Voith and Crone (1988) evaluated ofﬁce vacancy rates in seventeen metro areas for the
period June 1980 to June 1987. They discovered signiﬁcant differences in natural vacancy
rates between the markets both in terms of cycle frequency and amplitude. They
concluded that inter-market variation was signiﬁcant and called for additional research
on the relationship between the so-called natural vacancy rate and market conditions.
Downs (1993) addressed this call for additional research by showing that differences in
market equilibrium vacancy rates exist due to fundamental differences in market
conditions (supply and demand fundamentals). Stating that some markets contain a
higher fraction of rapidly growing ﬁrms or are experiencing faster population growth, he
concluded that dynamic markets will have higher vacancy rates than more static markets.
Thus, his research demonstrates the relationship of real estate cycles to general economic
cycles.
Pyhrr et al. (1990) created an empirical discounted cash ﬂow cycle model to illustrate
the quantitative relationships between key economic variables and real estate
performance. Pyhrr and Born (1993) later expanded the study to include supply and
demand cycles, property life cycles and urban economic cycles on real estate valuation
analysis.
Mueller and Laposa (1994) investigated the cyclical movements of ﬁfty-two ofﬁce
markets around the country. By examining average vacancy and the deviations from this
average as an indication of market risk or volatility, they classiﬁed and captured the
nature of cyclical risks inherent in these markets. They found that markets cycle
differently and that by examining the duration, amplitude and timing of a market’s cycle,
one could better understand the market forces that add to the risks of real estate
investing.
Shilton (1995) also examined ofﬁce market cycles by providing a framework for
understanding the characteristics of ofﬁce employment demand. His research found that
the economic base of a city inﬂuenced the rate of overall growth in ofﬁce employment. He
also showed the link between ofﬁce employment and market volatility and stated that
markets experiencing higher volatility in ofﬁce employment are more likely to experience
higher levels of ofﬁce vacancy.
The evidence is compelling that ofﬁce markets in different metro areas behave
differently over time and that some markets have longer cycles or less volatility than
others. Where previous studies have focused their sights on demonstrating market
cyclicality, this study seeks to eye the underlying causes of this cyclicality. This study
moves beyond the previous paradigms and identiﬁes other economic factors that underlie
this volatility by examining different stages of the real estate market cycle. It is essential
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Data and Methodology
A Full Cycle: 1978 to 1995
The following methodology uses semiannual data from thirty-one metropolitan areas
over the time period 1978 through 1995. Unless otherwise noted, real estate data from
C.B. Commercial/Torto-Wheaton were used. Although the Torto-Wheaton data currently
cover ﬁfty-four metro areas, data was limited to those areas for which data was available
over the entire eighteen-year time period to avoid inconsistencies in data due to timing
factors. This data set was used because it provides a consistent analysis of multiple
metropolitan areas over a long time period. Local reports, while sometimes more com-
prehensive, are difﬁcult to compare because of differences in collection methodologies,
e.g., treatment of sublease space, leased but available space, and owner-occupied and
government-occupied space.
Volatility in the market was measured by the change in vacancy from the average
vacancy over the entire time period. The average vacancy rate was used as a measure of
the ‘equilibrium’ rate at which point vacancies in a particular market would be expected
to oscillate above and below. Although several methods have been used to calculate an
equilibrium rate (Downs, 1993; Voith and Crone, 1988; Wheaton, 1987), Mueller and
Laposa (1994) illustrated that little difference results from the various methodologies. We
have therefore chosen to use an average vacancy rate as a measure of the equilibrium rate
from which to measure deviation. Voith and Crone (1988) also suggested that the
equilibrium rate for a particular market may change over time as the market itself
changes due to structural changes in the base economy, growth and other factors. While
we agree with this theory, we did not attempt to adjust the equilibrium rate over time
because the focus of this paper is to measure volatility and not the timing of a market
cycle. Each market’s cycle has been individually graphed along with its deviation in
absorption and construction in the Appendix.
Exhibit 1 illustrates the variance in vacancy rates across the different metropolitan
areas. Because of the high volumes of data needed to formally measure a cycle, we did not
attempt to scientiﬁcally measure the length of each market cycle. However, at least one
peak and valley exists for each market over the eighteen-year time period with low
vacancies often appearing in the 1979–81 time period and high vacancies often appearing
in the late 1980s. (Wheaton estimated a ten-to-twelve-year national ofﬁce market cycle.
Turning points in ten sample cities were within one or two years of the combined average
series. Furthermore, Shilton suggested seven-year cycles.) See the Appendix for vacancy
trend graphs of each metro area.
As seen in Exhibit 1, signiﬁcant differences seem to exist between vacancy trends in
different metro areas. Vacancies over the eighteen-year time period average from a low of
9.9% in Washington D.C. to a high of 19.3% in Dallas. Some trends begin to become
apparent in this initial chart. With the exceptions of Atlanta, Tampa and Indianapolis,
metros with high average vacancy rates also seem to have high standard deviations or
volatility in vacancy rates. Highly volatile markets also seem to be more concentrated in
the fast-growth southern areas and the ‘oil patch’ cities of the 1970s and 1980s (see
Exhibit 2).
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construction in bust-boom cities. However, Exhibit 3 shows that the standard deviation
(volatility) of absorption in these markets was almost as high as the volatility of new
construction (supply). Correlations between the three variables (Exhibit 4) are high,
suggesting that markets with volatile vacancy rates also experience volatility in supply
and absorption. Although absorption is not always a true measure of demand, some
demand-side interaction is suggested (low absorption may result from a lack of available
space in markets with low vacancy rates, even though demand is high). Additionally,
some highly volatile markets such as Oklahoma City also experienced very low vacancy
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Exhibit 1
Vacancies, Metro Areas, 1978–1995
Avg. Rate Std Dev. Min. Max.
Cities % % % %
Atlanta 16.8 (24) 4.2 (5) 9.0 (30) 27.4 (27)
Baltimore 13.2 (13) 4.7 (12) 3.7 (19) 21.9 (17)
Boston 11.3 (4) 4.4 (9) 2.7 (15) 17.9 (3)
Chicago 13.3 (15) 4.5 (11) 4.1 (20) 19.3 (8)
Cincinnati 13.1 (12) 4.8 (14) 2.2 (9) 19.9 (10)
Cleveland 12.2 (7) 5.4 (19) 2.2 (9) 21.2 (15)
Columbus 11.9 (5) 5.3 (17) 2.1 (8) 21.0 (14)
Dallas 19.3 (31) 7.8 (27) 4.7 (22) 28.3 (28)
Denver 17.4 (26) 7.9 (28) 2.6 (13) 26.9 (26)
Detroit 13.2 (14) 4.2 (6) 6.3 (27) 19.8 (9)
Hartford 13.6 (17) 8.1 (29) 1.9 (7) 24.7 (22)
Houston 18.8 (30) 9.0 (31) 5.6 (25) 31.4 (31)
Indianapolis 16.1 (23) 4.0 (3) 9.7 (31) 25.2 (23)
Jacksonville 13.5 (16) 4.3 (7) 4.7 (22) 21.4 (16)
Kansas 14.6 (19) 3.8 (1) 7.4 (28) 20.6 (11)
Los Angeles 14.4 (18) 6.4 (24) 2.3 (12) 22.9 (18)
Miami 15.7 (22) 7.8 (26) 1.4 (5) 25.2 (23)
Minneapolis 12.3 (8) 6.0 (22) 1.2 (3) 20.6 (11)
Nashville 15.4 (21) 5.8 (21) 3.0 (17) 23.2 (19)
New York 10.3 (3) 5.0 (15) 1.3 (4) 17.0 (1)
Oklahoma City 18.1 (27) 8.8 (30) 1.5 (6) 29.3 (30)
Philadelphia 12.9 (10) 3.9 (2) 3.0 (17) 17.9 (3)
Phoenix 18.2 (28) 7.0 (25) 6.0 (26) 28.5 (29)
Portland 12.6 (9) 5.4 (18) 2.6 (13) 20.8 (13)
Salt Lake City 14.9 (20) 5.5 (20) 5.3 (24) 24.0 (21)
San Diego 17.3 (25) 6.1 (23) 2.7 (15) 23.6 (20)
Seattle 12.1 (6) 4.5 (10) 2.2 (9) 18.6 (6)
San Francisco 10.2 (2) 4.8 (13) 1.0 (1) 18.1 (5)
St. Louis 12.9 (11) 4.1 (4) 4.5 (21) 19.0 (7)
Tampa 18.7 (29) 4.3 (8) 9.0 (29) 26.3 (25)
Washington D.C. 9.9 (1) 5.2 (16) 1.0 (1) 17.4 (2)
U.S. 13.7 4.8 4.3 19.1
Average 14.3 5.6 3.8 22.6
Minimum 9.9 3.8 1.0 17.0
Maximum 19.3 9.0 9.7 31.4rates over this time period (1.5%), suggesting that unexpected demand as well as extra
supply plays a large role in causing volatile markets.
A model was developed using both cross-sectional and time series data over the time
period 1978 to 1995 to analyze economic variables that affect volatility in vacancy rates.
The following model was estimated using ordinary least squares:
vmt 5amt + b1emplmt + b2densmt + b3stockmt + b4costmt + b5divmt
+ b6mfgmt + b7tax81t + b8tax86t+ b9uxempmt + b10debtmt + emt ,    (1)
where:
v 5 difference between the current vacancy and the average vacancy for
market m and time period t.
empl 5 the employment growth rate over the six-month time period. Total
employment was used. Ofﬁce employment would have been a
preferable variable, but historic data was not available for all years
and metros. The combination of FIRE and Service employment was
used as a proxy. Not unexpectedly, this measure did not provide
signiﬁcant results as several non-ofﬁce businesses are included in the
broad Service SIC code.
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Exhibit 2
Ofﬁce Market Volatility: 1996
Sources: LaSalle Advisors Investment Research, RFA
Z High Change in Vacancy
w Average Change in Vacancy
i Low Change in Vacancydens 5 population density of the metropolitan area, measured as the
population per square mile. Because the availability of land is difﬁcult
to measure, particularly over a long time period, this variable was
used as a substitute for the availability of land; the thought being 
that in general, the less densely populated an area is, the more land
should be available for new construction. Although there are always
exceptions because of zoning, regulations, environmental issues, and
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Exhibit 3
Metro Area Volatility and Absorption
Standard Deviation
Vacancy Construction Absorption Average
% % % Vacancy %
Dallas 7.8 4.5 3.4 19.3
Houston 9.0 4.2 3.6 18.8
Tampa 4.3 4.0 2.7 18.7
Phoenix 7.0 3.9 3.0 18.2
Oklahoma City 8.8 5.3 4.4 18.1
Denver 7.9 4.4 4.2 17.4
San Diego 6.1 3.3 2.9 17.3
Atlanta 4.2 2.3 2.2 16.8
Indianapolis 4.0 2.3 2.6 16.1
Miami 7.8 2.6 2.0 15.7
Nashville 5.8 2.8 2.6 15.4
Salt Lake City 5.5 2.9 2.9 14.9
Kansas City 3.8 2.3 2.0 14.6
Los Angeles 6.4 2.0 1.8 14.4
Hartford 8.1 2.4 2.6 13.6
Jacksonville 4.3 3.1 2.8 13.5
Chicago 4.5 1.6 1.5 13.3
Detroit 4.2 2.3 1.6 13.2
Baltimore 4.7 2.2 2.4 13.2
Cincinnati 4.8 2.5 2.0 13.1
St. Louis 4.1 2.4 1.6 12.9
Philadelphia 3.9 1.6 1.6 12.9
Portland 5.4 2.1 1.9 12.6
Minneapolis 6.0 2.6 2.3 12.3
Cleveland 5.4 1.6 1.9 12.2
Seattle 4.5 2.6 2.0 12.1
Columbus 5.3 2.3 1.8 11.9
Boston 4.4 2.1 1.5 11.3
New York 5.0 0.5 1.0 10.3
San Francisco 4.8 1.7 1.5 10.2
Washington D.C. 5.2 2.0 1.7 9.9
Maximum 9.0 5.3 4.4 19.3
Minimum 3.8 0.5 1.0 9.9
Average 5.6 2.7 2.3 14.3other factors, most areas should adhere somewhat loosely to this
principle.
stock 5 the ofﬁce stock measured in billions of square feet in the six-month
time period.
cost 5 the cost of doing business as provided by Regional Financial
Associates. This factor is the weighted average of energy costs in
dollars per kWh, tax revenue per capita, hourly earnings and ofﬁce
rents per square foot as provided by the National Real Estate Index.
The U.S. average is indexed to 100. This factor was not changed over
the time period.
tax81 5 a dummy variable to identify time periods after the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) act of 1981. Because ofﬁce
construction takes at least twelve to eighteen months to ﬁnish, a one-
year lag was used for this variable. Therefore, any records occurring in
1982 or after equaled 1 and those before 1982 equaled 0.
tax86 5 a dummy variable to identify time periods after the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA). A one-year lag was also used for this variable.
Therefore, any records occurring in 1987 or after equaled 1 and those
before 1987 equaled 0.
uxemp 5 a measure of unexpected employment growth. The variable measured
the current semiannual growth rate minus the average of the previous
three years’ semiannual growth rates.
mfg 5 a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by manufacturing industries as identiﬁed by SIC codes 20
to 39, except as included in other categories. All economic base
classiﬁcations were measured and changed every ﬁve years.
div 5 the economic diversity of the metro area. The diversity measure was
provided by Regional Financial Associates and was measured as the
Hachman Index (HI) which measures how closely the employment
distribution of a metro resembles that of the nation. The index
measures economic diversiﬁcation through the following formula:
HIt 5 1/(Sj (EMPMjt / EMPUSjt) 3 (EMPMjt)) ,
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Exhibit 4
Correlation Coefﬁcients
Avg. Vacancy Std Dev. Abs. Std Dev. Const. Std Dev. Vac.
Avg. Vacancy 1.000
Std Dev. Abs. 0.7946 1.000
p = 0.000
Std Dev. Const. 0.8226 0.9229 1.000
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Std Dev. Vac. 0.5257 0.6859 0.6353 1.000
p = 0.002 p = 0.000 p = 0.000where:  EMPMjt is the share of the metro area’s employment in
industry  j in year t and EMPUSjt is the share of U.S. employment in
industry j in year t. Because the economic base of metropolitan areas
change over time, this variable was calculated and changed every ﬁve
years from 1978 to 1995. In general, most of the markets become
slightly more diverse over the time period. Metros that exhibited the
biggest increase in diversity include: Salt Lake City, Indianapolis,
Atlanta, Phoenix, and Portland.
debt 5 the total debt ﬂow to U.S. commercial real estate measured in millions
of dollars from insurance companies, banks and savings & loans.
Although this factor does not include equity ﬂows, it was used as a
proxy for capital ﬂows to real estate.
The following variables did not load into the model:
govt 5 a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by government employment as identiﬁed by government
SIC codes and codes 91 to 97. All economic base classiﬁcations were
measured and changed every ﬁve years.
energy = a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by the energy industry as identiﬁed by SIC codes 10 to 14
and 29. All economic base classiﬁcations were measured and changed
every ﬁve years. All economic base classiﬁcations were measured
against a diversiﬁed economy, e.g., a diversiﬁed economy would have
a 0 in all economic base ﬁelds. None of the metros used in this study
fell into the following economic base classiﬁcations over the time
period: services - tourism, services - health, and farm. Thus, although
we include these classiﬁcations in diversity studies, they were not used
in this paper.
ﬁre = a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by ﬁnance, insurance and real estate industries as
identiﬁed by SIC codes 60 to 67. All economic base classiﬁcations
were measured and changed every ﬁve years.
distrib = a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by distribution of goods as identiﬁed by SIC codes 42, 50
and 51. All economic base classiﬁcations were measured and changed
every ﬁve years.
hitech = a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by high tech industries as identiﬁed by SIC codes 36, 38,
737, 357, and 873. All economic base classiﬁcations were measured
and changed every ﬁve years.
service = a dummy variable indicating the metro area’s economic base was
dominated by service companies as identiﬁed by SIC codes 79 to 89.
All economic base classiﬁcations were measured and changed every
ﬁve years.
rest = a development restrictiveness measure for each MSA as measured by
Godschalk and Hartzell (1993). For each city and its outlying areas,
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supply expansion willingness and length of review period. The study
showed the most restrictive MSA in California, while the least
restrictive was in Texas. Midwest and southern MSAs were mixed in
terms of restrictiveness. We were not able to change this variable over
time.
ent = an entrepreneurial index as measured by Cognetics. This index
measures the ability of a metropolitan area to foster and support
growth of new businesses. The index measures for each metro area:
the number of ﬁrms started in the last ten years that employ at least
ﬁve people today as a percent of all ﬁrms, and the percent of ﬁrms ten
years old or less, four years ago that had a high growth index over the
past four years.
unemp = the unemployment rate as of the beginning of the six-month time
period.
tbond = the real current interest rate of a ten-year t-bond as of the ﬁrst month
of the six-month time period.
Several interesting factors result from the regression. First, employment growth
appears to reduce volatility in vacancy rates (Exhibit 5). If employment growth boosts
absorption, then higher absorption rates should reduce vacancy rates or slow increases in 
vacancy if excess construction is present. However, the model also shows that unexpected
employment growth increases volatility. This may be indicative of markets such as Miami
and Minneapolis in which vacancy rates dipped to unusually low levels (below 2%)
during the eighteen-year time period. In this case, unexpected demand could cause
vacancy rates to drop lower if new construction was not anticipated to meet the extra
demand. It also means that volatility may not necessarily be a bad phenomenon, but
instead indicates a higher risk that demand and supply are swinging further in either
direction out of balance.
The manufacturing economic base classiﬁcation loaded into the model. Although
other economic base classiﬁcations did not load into the model, it does not mean that
these classiﬁcations are unimportant. In fact, the diversity index loaded into the model,
suggesting that more diverse metros are less volatile.
Three highly correlated variables describing the size and costs of the market loaded:
cost of doing business, size of the ofﬁce stock and population density. Because high-cost
cities tend to be larger and more densely populated (Exhibit 6), a signiﬁcant amount of
multicollinearity exists between these variables. A factor analysis model (discussed next)
was developed to better analyze these factors. 
The cost of doing business had a negative coefﬁcient in the model, indicating that
high-cost cities had lower volatility. With some exceptions, new construction measured as
a percent of the market has occurred to a greater extent in low-cost cities (correlation
coefﬁcient of –0.541) such as Tampa, Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Denver, and Salt Lake
City. Our conclusion is that the higher construction in these low-cost cities is more likely
to cause higher vacancy rates, at least on a short-term basis.
Population density loaded into the model with a negative coefﬁcient, indicating that
less dense areas experienced more volatility. This ﬁts with our theory that construction
will occur in areas where land is more available and excess construction will increase
BEST PAPER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 477volatility rates. In fact, the correlation coefﬁcient between population density and new
construction measured as a percentage of the total stock in the market was 20.538.
The size of the ofﬁce market (stock) also loaded into the model. However, the
coefﬁcient was positive, indicating that, if anything, larger markets are more volatile.
With large metros such as Dallas and Houston included in the model, it is easy to see
how large metros appeared more volatile over the 1978 to 1995 time period. The factor
analysis (discussed next) illustrates that the traditional large, high-cost, ﬁnancial-oriented
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Exhibit 5






DF Sum of Mean Sq.
Regression 10 23039.28820 2303.93882
Residual 1105 14966.28080 13.54415
F = 170.10588 Signif. F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE VB Beta T Sig. T
COST_BUS –3.832752 .944856 –.116379 –4.056 .0001
EMPLGRO –100.627722 10.687553 –.450951 –9.415 .0000
POP_DENS –.721561 .154018 –.161568 –4.685 .0000
STOCK 1.39206E-05 3.2816E-06 .142307 4.242 .0000
TAXLAWC1 3.327882 .309818 .285132 10.741 .0000
TAXLAWCH 6.850320 .365424 .488023 18.746 .0000
UNEXPEMP 74.321963 10.276388 .343765 7.232 .0000
DIVERS –2.578498 1.027810 –.053511 –2.509 .0123
DEBTFLOW 4.57935E-05 4.0576E-06 .262616 11.286 .0000
MFG –1.171119 .409019 –.058086 –2.863 .0043
Constant –.454270 1.266560 –.359 .7199
Variables Not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T  Sig. T
GOVT .031881 .045919 .155353 1.527 .1270
ENERGY .006464 .009027 .155206 .300 .7643
FIRE .009231 .013501 .155322 .449 .6538
DISTRIB –.008598 –.013161 .154392 –.437 .6620
HI_TECH –.013368 –.021139 .155343 –.703 .4825
@0YR_TBO –.051160 –.034646 .141200 –1.152 .2496
SERVICE .022938 .034732 .151604 1.155 .2485
UNEMPL –.008898 –.009392 .105982 –.312 .7550
RESTRICT .020947 .026927 .155298 .895 .3710metros do exhibit less volatility. It should also be noted that ofﬁce markets in this sample
ranged from 12.7 million square feet (msf) to 310 msf. It may be that markets or
submarkets smaller than 12.7 msf do experience more volatility, but we did not consider
extremely small markets or submarkets in this sample.
Both of the tax law variables loaded into the model with positive coefﬁcients. While we
do know that construction increased considerably in the late 1980s and vacancy rates were
highest from 1986 to 1992, we cannot make a deﬁnite assumption based on this analysis
that the increased construction and volatility was solely caused by changes in tax laws. 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) dramatically increased the attrac-
tiveness of real estate’s after-tax return by effectively creating a federal subsidy to the real
estate market through shortened depreciation schedules (ﬁfteen years), capital gains
exclusions and interest write-off provisions. This allowed syndicators to allocate
deductions to incoming partners that related to periods prior to their entry into the
partnership. Combined public and private syndication investments jumped from 
$1.9 billion prior to the passage of the Act to $8.3 billion just two years later. Thus we
would expect a positive coefﬁcient for this variable.
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), depreciation schedules were lengthened
from 15 to 27.5 years for residential and 31 years for nonresidential, and the 60%
exclusion from capital gains taxes was eliminated, causing the full capital gain to be taxed
at the same rate as ordinary income. Interest write-off provisions were also eliminated,
undermining the tax-driven viability of the syndication business. Thus, we would expect
a negative coefﬁcient for the second tax variable. However, although we allowed a one-
year lag on the variable, some of these reforms did not take place until later, e.g., the
capital gains tax was not fully enacted until 1988. Given the other investment trends
occurring during this time period and with a slowing economy beginning in 1989, it took
longer than a year for the markets to begin to recover from the excesses of the 1980s, even
with the assistance of the more development-restrictive TRA laws. Thus, we suspect that
this variable is still picking up the cumulative affects of the overbuilding of the 1980s.
Finally, the debt variable loaded into the model, indicating that as more capital
becomes available, market volatility increases. This variable picks up the effects of several
occurrences that increased capital to real estate over the 1978 to 1995 time period.
Foreign investment, at $7.3 billion in 1980, increased ﬁve-fold to $40 billion by 1988 due
partly to the sharp devaluation of the dollar relative to the Japanese yen, the German
deutsche mark, and the British pound. Between 1980 and 1989 (the peak year for foreign
investment in U.S. real estate), forty-ﬁve foreign investment institutions invested nearly
$39 billion of new capital in U.S. property. Added to this background were the U.S.
pension funds. Partly in response to ERISA’s “prudent man rule,” pension funds entered
the real estate arena. Pension fund investments increased from $19 billion to nearly $90
billion from 1980 to 1987. Although many of these factors were equity ﬂows, debt ﬂows
followed a similar pattern of rising in the 1980s and falling signiﬁcantly in the very late
1980s and early 1990s.
A few other factors did not load into the model. The development restrictiveness index
was deemed unimportant in estimating vacancy volatility. It could be that this variable
should have been changed over time. However, we did not have the data to determine if
or by how much the restrictiveness index changed. The entrepreneurial index was another
factor that did not load into the model and that we were not able to change over time.
The ﬁnal factors that did not load were unemployment and T-bond rates.
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Exhibit 6
Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables, 1978–1995
Debt Div.







DebtFlow 0.1129 0.3324 1.000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.000 p=.000 p=–
Tax 86 0.4833 0.0135 0.0424 1.000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.000 p=.652 p=.157 p=–
Tax 81 0.7171 0.7625 –0.3664 0.5345 1.000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=–
COB –0.0736 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.014 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=–
Stock 0.1359 0.0709 –0.0750 0.2056 0.1801 0.6546 1.000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.000 p=.018 p=.011 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=–
Div.Index 0.1216 0.0484 –0.1129 0.2178 0.1746 –0.2770 –0.1326 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.000 p=.106 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=–
Distrib 0.0695 0.0100 –0.0594 0.0961 0.0672 –0.1621 –0.0880 –0.0317
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.020 p=.739 p=.047 p=.001 p=.025 p=.000 p=.003 p=.290
Energy 0.0141 –0.0097 0.0579 –0.0936 –0.0654 –0.1555 0.1201 –0.1478
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.638 p=.746 p=.053 p=.002 p=.029 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000
FIRE –0.0199 0.0155 0.0565 –0.0406 –0.0108 –0.1633 0.0816 –0.1821
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.506 p=.606 p=.059 p=.175 p=.717 p=.000 p=.006 p=.000
Govt 0.0203 –0.0108 0.0064 –0.0402 –0.0338 0.0983 0.0115 –0.2670
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.499 p=.719 p=.831 p=.180 p=.260 p=.001 p=.700 p=.000
HiTech –0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –0.0352 –0.0439 0.0807
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.820 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=.240 p=.142 p=.007
MFG –0.0272 0.0024 0.0144 –0.0155 –0.0083 –0.0413 –0.1123 –0.2365
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.365 p=.936 p=.630 p=.605 p=.782 p=.168 p=.000 p=.000
Service –0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –0.1795 –0.1062 0.1687
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.824 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=1.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000
EmplGro –0.0992 0.0465 0.1375 –0.0168 0.0004 –0.1038 –0.1129 –0.0027
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.001 p=.120 p=.000 p=.576 p=.991 p=.001 p=.000 p=.929
UnexEmp 0.0333 0.1937 –0.0039 0.0495 0.1536 0.0010 0.0139 0.0228














–0.0906 –0.0934 –0.2105 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.002 p=.002 p=.000 p=–
–0.0472 –0.0487 –0.1097 –0.0640 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.115 p=.104 p=.000 p=.033 p=–
–0.0825 –0.0850 –0.1916 –0.1117 –0.0582 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.006 p=.005 p=.000 p=.000 p=.052 p=–
–0.0472 –0.0487 –0.1097 –0.0640 –0.0333 –0.0582 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.115 p=.104 p=.000 p=.033 p=.266 p=.052 p=–
–0.0079 0.0158 0.0173 0.0120 0.0034 –0.0561 0.0718 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116
p=.791 p=.598 p=.563 p=.690 p=.909 p=.061 p=.016 p=–
0.0104 –0.0121 0.0064 –0.0189 –0.0036 0.0108 0.0012 0.8795 1.0000
N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116 N=1116Because of the multicollinearity existing in the regression model, a factor analysis was
next conducted to analyze the economic factors that affect the volatility of ofﬁce markets
while diminishing the effects of highly correlated independent variables. Although
multicollinearity does not affect the explanation power of the model, it may affect the
selection process of variables that are loaded into the model. In other words, variables
that were not loaded into the model may actually be important in explaining the
variation in vacancy rates.
The following factor model was used to investigate the relationship between the
variables in our study:
p
Fj 5SWjiXi 5Wj1X11Wj2X21 . . . 1WjpXp , (1)
i51
where Wi ’s are known as factor score coefﬁcients, and p is the number of variables.
To help determine the number of factors needed to represent the data, two steps were
taken. In the ﬁrst we examined the amount of variance explained by each factor.
Although the analysis gave us ﬁfteen factors, Exhibit 7 shows that 67.2% of the total
variance is attributable to the ﬁrst ﬁve. The remaining ten factors account for the other
32.8% of the variance. Thus, a model of ﬁve factors may be adequate to represent the
data. In the second step, we examined the eigenvalues as illustrated in the scree plot in
Exhibit 8. One accepted criterion suggests that only those factors with eigenvalues over 1
should be included. The plot shows a distinct break between the steep slope of the large
factors and the gradual trailing off of the remaining factors with eigenvalues over 1. It
becomes apparent that ﬁve factors are sufﬁcient to represent the data.
An orthogonal rotation was performed on the factor matrix and the coefﬁcients that
relate the variables to the ﬁve factors were determined. The coefﬁcients or factor loadings
indicate how much weight is assigned to each factor, thus the strength of the relationship
between the factor and the underlying variable(s). Several interesting ﬁndings are worth
noting.
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Exhibit 7
Variance Explained by Each Factor
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var. Cum. Pct
T-Bond 1.00000 * 1 3.07986 20.5 20.5
DebtFlow 1.00000 * 2 2.18353 14.6 35.1
Tax 86 1.00000 * 3 1.85423 12.4 47.5
Tax 81 1.00000 * 4 1.53438 10.2 57.7
UnexEmp 1.00000 * 5 1.42584 9.5 67.2
COB 1.00000 * 6 1.19690 8.0 75.2
FIRE 1.00000 * 7 .94919 6.3 81.5
Stock 1.00000 * 8 .77130 5.1 86.6
Mfg 1.00000 * 9 .64093 4.3 90.9
Govt 1.00000 * 10 .52109 3.5 94.4
Div.Index 1.00000 * 11 .35857 2.4 96.8
Entrepren. 1.00000 * 12 .21838 1.5 98.2
Pop_Dens 1.00000 * 13 .12022 .8 99.0
Restrict. 1.00000 * 14 .07826 .5 99.6
EmplGrowth 1.00000 * 15 .06732 .4 100.0In the previous regression analysis, interest rates (as proxied by T-bonds) did not load
into the equation. As mentioned earlier, problems arising from multicollinearity may
have prevented them from doing so. In this analysis however, we found that factors 2 and
4 capture not only the interest rate but the two tax laws and debt ﬂows as well, suggesting
that these factors characterize those variables that help to explain the availability of
capital. 
Expected employment as well as unexpected employment load highly on factor 3,
making this factor employment based. Factor 1 appears to represent large, high-cost
metros with a strong entrepreneurial base. This becomes clearer with a closer look at the
variables underlying the factor. The size of the ofﬁce market, as measured by the amount
of stock, loaded very highly (.805). It is not surprising to ﬁnd the cost of doing business
variable loading onto this factor (.897) as high-cost cities are highly correlated to larger
cities. It is also not surprising to ﬁnd population density with a strong loading (.889) as
population density is synonymous with large metros.
The degree of economic concentration was measured by factor 5 with three economic
base variables, FIRE, manufacturing and government, loading strongly on this factor.
These variables show the degree to which cities are respectively dominated by economic
base categories. The variable measuring the economic diversity of each market (the
Hachman Diversity Measure) loaded most strongly on this factor but negative to the
economic variables. Thus, it appears as though this factor is a measure of economic
concentration. 
It should be noted that not all variables used in the onset of this factor analysis could
be sufﬁciently explained by this ﬁve-factor model. The economic-based variables of
distribution, energy, hitech and service had minimal variance explained (see Exhibit 9) by
the 5 factor model and therefore were removed from further consideration.
We have now derived ﬁve factors that illustrate the relationships among the sets of
many interrelated variables (Exhibit 9). To test if these factors affect the volatility of ofﬁce
markets, factor scores were derived and used in the following step-wise regression model:
vmt 5 amt + b1FAC1mt + b2FAC2mt + b3FAC3mt + b4FAC4mt + b5FAC5mt + emt , (3)
where vm,t is the difference between the current vacancy and the average vacancy for





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Factor Numbersmarket m and time period t, FAC1 through FAC5 are the ﬁve factors, as previously
described, that were derived from the factor model, and emtis a random error term. 
The results from equation 3 are shown in Exhibit 10. The results show that factors 2 and
4, or interest rates and capital availability, dominate the model. The amount of variance
explained by these factors (nearly 52%) relative to the remaining three, illustrates the
strength of these factors in explaining the volatility in vacancy rates. However, this model
measures a time period (early to late 80s) that saw an overwhelming amount of capital
pour into the market which may exaggerate the signiﬁcance of this factor.
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Exhibit 10
Step-Wise Regression Model (of Factor Coefﬁcients)
R2 0.51976
Adj. R2 0.51846
Depend. Variable: Vacancy - Average Vacancy (Volatility in Vacancy Rates)
B t Sig. T
Independent Variables
Factor 2 3.962118 32.656 .0000
Factor 3 –.372777 –3.072 .0022
Factor 4 1.370777 11.298 .0000
Constant .762246 6.285 .0000
Factors Not in the Model:
Factor 1 – Metro Condition
Factor 5 – Economic Base Concentration
Exhibit 9
Factor Matrix
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var. Cum. Pct
T-Bond .88958 * 1 3.07986 20.5 20.5
Tax 86 .93804 * 2 2.18353 14.6 35.1
Tax 81 .73118 * 3 1.85423 12.4 47.5
COB .81493 * 4 1.53438 10.2 57.7
Stock .73059 * 5 1.42584 9.5 67.2
EmplGro .95422 *
UnexEmp .94052 *







DebtFlow .68660 *Nevertheless, the coefﬁcient suggests that as capital becomes more available, the more
volatile a market. This certainly was experienced in the 1980s when capital ﬂooded the
market and real estate construction was driven primarily by the availability of this capital.
The only other factor to load into the model, factor 3, deemed the employment factor,
has a negative coefﬁcient, suggesting that expected employment growth appears to lessen
volatility. This is consistent with the results of the ﬁrst regression analysis. In the ﬁrst
regression analysis, however, the unexpected component of employment had a positive
coefﬁcient, suggesting that it contributed to increased volatility. It appears that when both
components are combined, and not held in isolation of each other as they were in the ﬁrst
analysis, the added volatility associated with the unexpected component is negated.
Factors 1 and 5, measuring metro condition (size, cost and ability to foster and
support growth of new business) and economic concentration, respectively, did not load
into the model. This model is clearly dominated by the supply of capital.
Real Estate Recovery: 1991 to 1995
Because the national variables, including the availability of capital inﬂuence on the
market, so dominated the model, an analysis of the data was run from 1991 to 1995. The
attempt was to isolate the availability of capital inﬂuence on the market and to examine
the recovery period of the ofﬁce market cycle (Exhibit 11) and the variables that
characterize this stage. The 1991 to 1995 time period was characterized by little new
supply on the market and in general, decreasing vacancy rates, indicating a demand-side
response (Exhibit 12). The theory now being explored is that without a supply response
in the market, demand-side variables should have a stronger inﬂuence on the volatility of
vacancy rates.
The step-wise regression estimated in equation 1 was recalculated using only data from
1991 to 1995 for the thirty-one metro areas. Without the effects of the debt (capital















RISING MARKET SUPPLY RESPONSE
EQUILIBRIUM
FALLING MARKETavailability) and tax law variables, the demand-side variables now explain 55% of the
variance (Exhibit 13) in ofﬁce vacancy rates (compared to an R2 of 6% without the debt
and tax law variables but using the 1978 to 1995 time period). One national variable, the
T-bond rate, did load into the model, but only explains 2% of the variance. Five other
variables now load into the model that did not previously load: the restrictiveness index,
unemployment rates and economic base classiﬁcations of service, government and
distribution. Service and distribution economic base variables have negative coefﬁcients
indicating that service and distribution-oriented metros recovered faster over this time
period; whereas government-oriented economies recovered more slowly. Additionally, the
negative coefﬁcient on the restrictiveness index indicates that less restrictive areas are
more volatile. The variables having the largest effect on recovery in a step-wise regression
include in order of importance: unemployment rate, employment growth, unexpected
employment growth, and cost of doing business.
Further Analysis of the Effects of High Volatility
Further analysis of the effects of high volatility rates on ofﬁce markets was then
undertaken. Exhibit 14 illustrates for each market, the standard deviation of the vacancy
rate over the eighteen-year time period, the average vacancy rate and the average rent
growth over the time period. Both the average vacancy rate and the average rent growth
are highly correlated to the volatility of the market. The exhibit also shows that highly
volatile markets tend to have high average vacancy rates and lower rent growth than other
markets. One exception to this is Atlanta, which experienced high average vacancy rates
but relatively low volatility and high rent growth. Other exceptions are Tampa and
Indianapolis which experienced high average vacancy rates, but low volatility, indicating
that these markets tend to have high vacancy rates that stayed high over the time period.
Further analysis of the causes for these outliers is warranted.
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Exhibit 12
U.S. Ofﬁce Market, 1980s–1990s
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99






This analysis attempted to quantify real estate risk, as measured by volatility in ofﬁce
vacancy rates, by examining various metropolitan areas at different stages of the real
estate cycle. Previous research has demonstrated that the volatility of metropolitan ofﬁce
markets can be tied to a wide variety of economic factors from both the supply and
demand side. This research suggests that, depending on the stage of the real estate cycle,








DF Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Regression 10 2459.11212 245.91121
Residual 299 2010.34067 6.72355
F = 36.57462 Signif. F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig. T
DISTRIB –1.288074 .523546 –.100293 –2.460 .0144
@YR_TBO –82.047585 20.786658 –.155303 –3.947 .0001
SERVICE –1.823875 .864521 –.084869 –2.110 .0357
EMPLGRO –201.571828 27.852282 –1.050897 –7.237 .0000
MFG 1.106505 .552967 .082171 2.001 .0463
GOVT 2.345280 .536751 .182619 4.370 .0000
RESTRICT –.244353 .060602 –.201331 –4.032 .0001
UNEMPL .721067 .142051 .299353 5.076 .0000
UNEXPEMP 161.932720 27.879736 .785518 5.808 .0000
COST_BUS –3.300311 1.267732 –.154015 –2.603 .0097
Constant 8.645433 1.686395 5.127 .0000
Variables Not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig. T
ALLDEBT –.029748 –.036405 .061583 –.629 .5299
HI_TECH .025106 .036090 .070741 .623 .5335
ENERGY .004223 .005838 .067162 .101 .9198
POP_DENS –.075667 –.067346 .064859 –1.165 .2449
FIRE .054022 .073201 .071018 1.267 .2061
ENTREP –.037970 –.041533 .067645 –.718 .4736
DIVERS –.085704 –.101176 .070872 –1.756 .0802
STOCK .012351 .011382 .058766 .197 .8444these factors vary in their ability to inﬂuence the market. Speciﬁcally, over the eighteen-
year period studied, the availability of capital had the strongest effect on the volatility of
ofﬁce vacancy rates. Although capital ﬂows may not be spread evenly among different
metros, this factor appears to be strongly tied to a national trend with few, if any, markets
escaping its inﬂuence. The regression results and the factor analysis both indicated that
further study into the availability of capital to a particular market is warranted. On the
other hand, when periods that follow excess construction were studied, market-speciﬁc,
demand-side factors appeared to be the dominant inﬂuence. These factors include
expected and unexpected employment growth, the economic base of the area, the cost of
doing business, and the development restrictiveness of the area.
This study analyzed thirty-one ofﬁce markets on a semiannual basis over the eighteen-
year time period from 1978 to 1995. Using the absolute difference of the vacancy rate in
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Exhibit 14
Volatile Markets and Vacancy Rates, 1978–1995
Avg. Std Dev. Avg. Rent
Vacancy Vacancy Growth
Cities % Rank % Rank % Rank
Dallas 19.3 (31) 7.8 (27) –2.1 (29)
Houston 18.8 (30) 9.0 (31) –2.0 (28)
Tampa 18.7 (29) 4.3 (8) –1.4 (20)
Phoenix 18.2 (28) 7.0 (25) –1.2 (19)
Oklahoma City 18.1 (27) 8.8 (30) –2.5 (31)
Denver 17.4 (26) 7.9 (28) –1.9 (25)
San Diego 17.3 (25) 6.1 (23) –1.7 (22)
Atlanta 16.8 (24) 4.2 (5) –0.1 (2)
Indianapolis 16.1 (23) 4.0 (3) –1.0 (16)
Miami 15.7 (22) 7.8 (26) –1.1 (18)
Nashville 15.4 (21) 5.8 (21) –1.0 (15)
Salt Lake City 14.9 (20) 5.5 (20) –0.6 (9)
Kansas City 14.6 (19) 3.8 (1) –0.4 (3)
Los Angeles 14.4 (18) 6.4 (24) –1.7 (23)
Hartford 13.6 (17) 8.1 (29) –2.0 (26)
Jacksonville 13.5 (16) 4.3 (7) 0.0 (1)
Chicago 13.3 (15) 4.5 (11) –0.9 (13)
Detroit 13.2 (14) 4.2 (6) –0.5 (4)
Baltimore 13.2 (13) 4.7 (12) –1.0 (14)
Cincinnati 13.1 (12) 4.8 (14) –0.5 (5)
St. Louis 12.9 (11) 4.1 (4) –1.1 (17)
Philadelphia 12.9 (10) 3.9 (2) –0.8 (11)
Portland 12.6 (9) 5.4 (18) –0.7 (10)
Minneapolis 12.3 (8) 6.0 (22) –0.6 (8)
Cleveland 12.2 (7) 5.4 (19) –2.2 (30)
Seattle 12.1 (6) 4.5 (10) –0.9 (12)
Columbus 11.9 (5) 5.3 (17) –0.5 (6)
Boston 11.3 (4) 4.4 (9) –2.0 (27)
New York 10.3 (3) 5.0 (15) –1.5 (21)
San Francisco 10.2 (2) 4.8 (13) –1.8 (24)
Washington D.C. 9.9 (1) 5.2 (16) –0.6 (7)
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eeach time period from the average vacancy rate for the metro area over the entire time
period as a measure of market volatility, the study found that employment growth,
availability of capital, and market conditions, such as size of the market and economic
diversiﬁcation of the metropolitan area, affected vacancy rates. The availability of capital
dominated the model in the time period from 1978 to 1995. However, metropolitan
effects appear to dominate in the most recent time period (1991 to 1995) due to the lack
of new supply and the retreat of capital. While markets seem to depend much more on
demand-side variables during the recovery phase of the cycle, the model also suggests
that the rapid return of capital currently underway will, in time, lead to a “national”
effect. Thus, this research concludes that the determinants of vacancy rate risk, and hence
ﬁnancial risk, vary depending on the stage of the real estate cycle.
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